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For decades, state chartering of public corporations and Delaware's domination of 
this activity have been criticized by many business law scholars. 1 They believe, as Bill 
Cary put it, that Delaware has led a "race for the bottom" that has "watered the rights of 
shareholders ... down to a thin grue1."2 To escape this "race for the bottom," some have 
urged mandatory federal chartering of public corporations. 3 Even among critics of state 
chartering, this position has never commanded broad support for fear that mandatory 
* Schott-van den Eynden Professor of Business Organizations Law, Case Western Reserve University School of 
Law. The author thanks Judy Kaul and Ryan De Young for their invaluable research assistance. 
l. Delaware is the domicile of 58% of publicly traded companies, 59% of the Fortune 500 companies, 
and 68% of companies that went public during 1996-2000. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms' 
Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 J.L. & EcoN. 383, 389 (2003). Most public companies that are not 
incorporated in Delaware are incorporated in their home state.Jd. at 420. Fewer than 10% of public companies 
are incorporated in a foreign state other than Delaware. 
2. William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 666 
(1974). However, the race to the bottom was alleged earlier by Justice Brandeis in Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 
288 U.S. 5 I 7, 559 (I933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting in part) ("The race was one not of diligence but of!axity."). 
See also Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in 
C01poration Law, I 05 HARv. L. REV. 1458 (1992) (arguing that state competition for corporations does not 
lead to maximized shareholder value); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Lcrw, 89 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1461, 1506--07 (1989) (discussing the debate concerning Delaware corporate law); Guhan 
Subramanian, The Disappearing Delcrware Effect, 20 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 32, 56-57 (2004) (examining 
additional evidence to support the "race for the bottom" theory). 
3. See infra note 66. 
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federal incorporation would only make matters worse. 4 Whatever the flaws of 
incorporation in Delaware, they cannot be too bad, or investors would flee Delaware 
corporations for companies chartered in other states. Because mandatory federal 
incorporation would preempt all competition, it threatens abuse with no means of escape. 
This objection disappears, though, if federal incorporation were voluntary. 5 The 
federal government then would simply offer a 51st option that would be elected only if 
superior to the other 50. If the choice were entrusted to shareholders, they could escape 
the status quo in which states compete for franchise fees primarily by appealing to 
corporate executives. Even if federal incorporation never became dominant, its potential 
appeal to investors would prod Delaware to pay them more heed. 
Part I of this Article describes the current corporate governance problem and defects 
of state chartering. Part II explains why federal incorporation is likely to be superior. Part 
III weighs and rejects mandatory federal incorporation of public companies. Part N 
argues for optional federal incorporation. 
I. WHY FEDERAL INCORPORATION? 
A. The Growing C01porate Governance Problem 
Complaints about corporate governance have been voiced for as long as there have 
been public companies. The central problem was long ago identified as the separation of 
ownership and control-executives (especially the chief executive officer (CEO)) held 
sway and could run public companies to their own advantage and at the expense of the 
shareholders. 6 In theory, a corporation is "managed by or under the direction of a board 
of directors." 7 Also in theory, the directors are chosen by (and thus responsive to) the 
shareholders. The executives are hired hands who serve at the pleasure of the board. In 
practice, however, CEOs deeply influence, if not entirely dominate, their boards. 
Recent developments show that the corporate governance problem has not abated 
and may indeed have worsened. 8 Executive compensation at public companies has 
4. See infra note 79 (providing citations to authorities discussing problems with mandatory federal 
incorporation). 
5. Optional federal incorporation has occasionally been suggested, but has never been adopted. For 
recent suggestions, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: 
Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, I 12 YALE L.J. 553, 611-12 (2002) (arguing that 
shareholders should receive a vote regarding corporate reincorporation to another state); Lucian Arye Bebchuk 
& Allen Ferrell, A New Approach to Takeover Lcrw and Regulatory Competition, 87 VA. L. REV. II I, 163 
(2001) (proposing the creation of an optional federal incorporation regime); Steven A. Ramirez, The End of 
Co1porate Governance Law: Optimizing Regulatory Structures for a Race to the Top, 24 YALE 1. ON REG. 3 13, 
352 (2007) (arguing that shareholders should be able to elect incorporation under a federal corporate law). 
However, the idea is not new-it was proposed by President Taft a century ago. William Howard Taft, 
President of the United States, Special Message to Congress, available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid=68486 (last visited Jan. 31, 2010). 
6. See ADOLF BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRN ATE PROPERTY 
124 (1932) (discussing the conflict inherent in separating management and control). 
7. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 14l(a) (2010). 
8. "The most significant problem facing corporate America today is the management-dominated, passive 
board of directors." Charles M. Elson, Director Compensation and the Management-Captured Board-The 
History of a Symptom and a Cure, 50 SMUL. REv. 127, 127 (I996).See also JOHN GILLESPIE &DAVID ZWEIG, 
MONEY FOR NOTHING: How THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE BOARDS Is RUINING AMERICAN BUSINESS AND 
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ballooned to wild excess. 9 Worse, the compensation plans of many CEOs have little to do 
with the success of the company. 10 Stock options are intended to motivate CEOs to raise 
the firm's stock price, but many boards back-date or "spring load" options so that CEOs 
profit even if the stock does not appreciate. I I 
The current economic downturn has revealed another facet of the problem. The 
compensation plans of many CEOs offer them lavish rewards if their companies prosper, 
but leave them unscathed if their companies flounder. In other words, managers and 
stockholders share in the good times, but in bad times the shareholders alone suffer all the 
losses. 12 Not surprisingly, CEOs respond to these incentives by committing their 
COSTING US TRILLIONS 5 (2009); D. QUINN MlLLS, WHEEL, DEAL AND STEAL: DECEPTIVE ACCOUNTING, 
DECEITFUL CEOS, AND INEFFECTIVE REFORMS 183 (2003) ("CEOs have found a way to enormously increase 
their own wealth by a variety of means in a period in which shareholders have been losing their shirts .... [T]he 
core of the problem faced by investors today, as revealed by corporate scandals, is that investors must be better 
protected from CEOs."); John C. Coates N, Measuring the Domain of Mediating Hierarchy: How Contestable 
Are U.S. Public C01porations?, 24 J. CORP. L. 837, 847 (1999) ("Both theoretical and empirical reasons exist to 
believe that boards of a substantial minority, and perhaps a substantial majority, of U.S. public companies are 
dominated by managers."); Glyn A. Holton, Investor Suffrage Movement, 62 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 15, 19 (2006) 
(stating that "[r]ecent market crashes and financial scandals are symptomatic of a capitalism in which 
shareholders have lost control over the corporations they own" and urging steps to make shareholder voting 
more effective); Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: 
Theories and Evidence, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 898, 898-903, 913-17 (1996) (cataloging the many ways that CEOs 
dominate outside directors); Roberta Romano, Less Is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable 
Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 174, 192 (2001) ("Firms whose boards have a 
majority of independent directors ... do not perform significantly better than those whose boards ... have 
fewer outside directors."); James Surowiecki, Board Stiff, NEW YORKER, June I, 2009, at 34 ("All these 
changes [in board composition], though, have had a much smaller impact than expected."). Sophisticated 
investors realize this. See Rachel McTague, Advisers, High-Net-Worth Investors Think Boards Serve 
Executives, Survey Says, 39 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1662, 1662 (2007) ("A survey of more than 200 
investment advisers and high-net-worth investors found that the respondents clearly perceive that corporate 
boards primarily answer to management, rather than shareholders .... "). 
9. George W. Dent, Jr., Academics in Wonderland: 17ze Team Production and Director Primacy Models 
of C01porate Governance, 44 Hous. L. REv. 1213, 1244-46 (2008); Richard A. Posner, Are American CEOs 
Ove1paid, and, if So, What if Anything Should Be Done About It?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1041 (2009) ("Theory 
and evidence suggest that there is indeed overcompensation of the CEOs of American publicly held 
corporations."). Despite the current recession "many boards are handsomely rewarding bosses." Nanette Byrnes 
& Jena McGregor, CEO Pay: Is It Still Out of Sync?, Bus. WK., Sept. 7, 2009, at 22. 
10. LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE 7 (2004); Ronald R. Mau & 
Catherine Shenoy, CEO Compensation: Does Performance Matter? (June 2009) (unpublished manuscript, 
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=l431490) (describing the results of an empirical study finding that CEOs 
can increase their compensation before exceptionally bad performance through the timing of option exercises). 
II. See Jesse M. Fried, Option Backdating and Its Implications, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 853, 886 (2008) 
("Secret backdating ... provides further support for the view that managerial power has played an important 
role in shaping executive compensation arrangements."). "Spring-loading" "describes the practice where a 
corporate executive receives stock options shortly before the release of favorable company news that is 
expected to raise the company's stock price." Matthew E. Orso, "Spring-Loading" Executive Stock Options: An 
Abuse in Need of a Federal Remedy, 53 Sr. LOUIS U. L.J. 629, 631 (2009). The practice seems to be common. 
See David Yennack, Good Timing: CEO Stock Option Awards and Company News Announcements, 52 J. FIN. 
449, 449-50 (1997) (noting that CEOs can "obtain more performance-based pay in advance of anticipated stock 
price increases); see also Lucian Bebchuk et al., Lucky CEOs and Lucky Directors, J. FIN (forthcoming 2009), 
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=I443364 (describing an empirical study "find[ing] that both CEO and 
independent directors received an abnormally high number oflucky grants" of stock options). 
12. See RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRJSJS OF 08 AND THE DESCENT INTO 
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companies to huge risks. 13 This strategy disastrously exacerbated the damage to investors 
when the economy and the stock market collapsed. Obviously corporate boards were not 
protecting shareholders when they adopted these plans. 
The flight of capital abroad has underscored America's corporate governance 
problem. Until recently the United States was unrivaled as an investment venue. Now 
many countries protect investors better than America does. 14 As the Paulson Committee 
found, the resulting exodus of investors threatens to deprive American industry of the 
funds needed for robust growth. 15 The costs of our poor corporate governance are 
large. 16 
For over 75 years, the federal government and stock exchanges have added a second 
layer of regulation of public companies to the state corporation laws, including SEC 
registration and disclosure obligations, proxy regulation, increasingly rigorous standards 
DEPRESSION 93 (2009) ("The tendency of corporate management ... to maximize short-run profits ... is 
strengthened if, as on Wall Street during the boom, executive compensation is both very generous and truncated 
on the downside."); Michael Jensen, The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence, in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, 
AND TARGET: THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER 314, 320 (John C. Coffee, Jr. et al. eds., 1988) 
("Sometimes [myopic behavior] occurs when managers hold little stock in their companies and are compensated 
in ways that motivate them to take actions to increase accounting earnings rather than the value of the firm."); 
JeffMadrick, How We Were Ruined & What We Can Do, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 12,2009, at 15, 16, available 
at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/22280 ("The ability to take immediate [personal] profits from fees on risky 
loans infected the financial industry and eventually the entire economy, and made possible disproportionately 
large annual bonuses."); David I. Walker, The Challenge of Improving the Long-Term Focus of Executive Pay 4 
(Boston Univ. School of Law, Working Paper No. 09-22, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1396663 
("Perhaps the leading corporate governance concern of legislators and commentators at the present is the 
reckless pursuit of short-term profits by corporate executives who will have cashed out before the long-term 
repercussions are felt."); David I. Walker, Evolving Executive Equity Compensation and the Limits of Optimal 
Contracting 3 (Boston Univ. School of Law, Working Paper No. 09-34, 2009), available at 
http://ssm.com/abstract=l443170 ("Some commentators and policymakers believe that heavy use of options led 
to excessive risk taking which contributed to the recent financial meltdown as well as earlier fiascos .... "); 
Luigi Zingales, The Future of Securities Regulation 23 (Chicago Booth School of Business, Research Paper No. 
08-27, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1319648 ("The 2007-8 financial crisis is perceived as a 
manifestation of excessive risk taking by managers who were enriching themselves with short term bonuses, 
while destroying the long term value of their companies."). But see RUdiger Fahlenbrach & Rene M. Stulz, 
Bank CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis 25 (Charles A. Dice Center, Working Paper No. 2009-13, 2009), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=l439859 (finding no connection between CEO compensation incentives 
and the meltdown of banks). 
13. See Chris Armstrong & Rahul Vashishtha, Executive Stock Options and Risk Substitution 30-31 (Dec. 
17, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=l525025) (finding that CEOs with 
more stock options tend to increase the firm's risk). 
14. See George W. Dent, Jr., The Essential Unity of Shareholders and the Myth of Investor Short-
Terrnism, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 97, 148 n.234 (2010) (discussing foreign countries with stronger shareholder 
rights than the United States). 
15. INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION 16 (2006), available at 
http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee_lnterim_ReportREV2.pdf. 
16. See Paul Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. EcON. 107, 145 (2003) 
(stating that gains from improved corporate governance "would be enormous"); Gretchen Morgenson, Too 
Many 'No' Votes To Be Ignored, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 20, 2009, at BUl (quoting money manager and investor 
activist Frederick E. Rowe as estimating that "the excess costs associated with management compensation, Wall 
Street fees and political expenditures by corporations reduce investor returns about 3 percent on average every 
year"). Note also the subtitle of GILLESPIE & ZWEIG, supra note 8: "How the Failure of Corporate Boards is 
Ruining American Business and Costing us Trillions." 
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of independence for directors, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). Some of these 
regulations have been beneficiaJ.l7 Others have been ineffective or counterproductive.l8 
The SEC is now considering changes to the proxy rules to allow broader shareholder 
initiatives.l9 With certain minor exceptions, though, these national standards have not 
addressed internal corporate affairs, which remain primarily in the jurisdiction of the 
states. Federal regulations have not significantly improved corporate governance and 
were not intended to do so. 
B. The Failure of State Chartering 
Some believe that state chartering has led to a "race to the top," with the states 
competing to offer the best corporate law.20 In practice, however, there is not much of a 
race because of weak incentives for and impediments to the competition. 21 More 
important, although there is some competition to offer the best corporate law, one must 
ask, "best for whom?" Unfortunately, the answer is not the best law for shareholders, but 
the best for corporate managers. 
17. See Irwin Friend & Edward S. Herman, The S.E.C. Through a Glass Darkly, 37 J. Bus. 382, 389 
(1964) ("We doubt that any person reasonably well acquainted with the evolution of the stock-market practices 
between the pre- and post-S.E.C. periods could lament or underrate the success of the new legislation in 
eradicating many of [the] weaknesses in our capital markets."); Michael Greenstone et al., Mandated 
Disclosure, Stock Returns, and the 1964 Securities Acts Amendments, 121 Q.J. ECON. 399, 403 (2006) 
("Overall, the results suggest that the benefits of the I 964 Amendments substantially outweighed the costs of 
complying with this law as measured by stock returns."). 
18. See, e.g., HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RlBSTEIN, THE SARBANES-OXLEY DEBACLE: WHAT WE'VE 
LEARNED; How To FIX IT 3 (2006) (calling SOX a "costly mistake" that was enacted in a "regulatory panic" 
and imposed net costs of $1.1 trillion); Anwer S. Ahmed et al., How Costly Is the Sarbanes Oxley Act? 
Evidence on the Effects of the Act on Corporate Profitability (Sept. 29, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1480394) (finding that "average cash flows decline by 1.3 percent of total 
assets after SOX"); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack C01porate 
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1528 (2005) (calling SOX "ill-conceived"). But see Stephen Wagner & Lee 
Ditmar, The Unexpected Benefits of Sarbanes-Oxley, HARv. Bus. REV., Apr. 2006, at 133, 140 (claiming that 
SOX improved operations of American companies). 
19. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-60,089, 74 Fed. Reg. 
29,029 (June 18, 2009). 
20. See Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the The01y of the Corporation, 6 I. 
LEGAL STUD. 251, 264 (1977) (stating that state corporate law has caused competition among the states for 
corporations-particularly Delaware); see also ROBERTA ROMANO, THE ADVANTAGE OF COMPETITNE 
fEDERALISM FOR SECURITIES REGULATION 213 (2002); William J. Carney, The Political Economy of 
Competition for Corporate Charters, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 303, 303 (1997); Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law 
Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525, 541 (2001); Frank H. Easterbrook, Managers' Discretion and 
investors' Welfare: Theories and Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 540, 549-50 (1984); Daniel R. Fischel, The 
"Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's C01poration Law, 76 Nw. 
U. L. REv. 913, 919-20 (1982). 
21. See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 5, at 584; Renee M. Jones, Rethinldng CoipOJ'ate Federalism in 
the Era ojC01porate Refonn, 29 J. CORP. L. 625, 631-33 (2004); Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, T11e Myth of 
State Competition in Co~porate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 738 (2002) (arguing that many obstacles stand 
between states and the "top"). 
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I. The Weakness of State Competition 
It might seem that other states have motivation to challenge Delaware for corporate 
franchise fees and related income, and could do so by simply drafting a corporate law 
better than Delaware's, even if only slightly so. This is not the case. First, the financial 
motive is not that great. Delaware does get much of its state revenues from franchise 
fees. 22 It also realizes related income. For instance, for a small, economically minor state 
' Delaware has a remarkably large and prosperous corporate bar because of the importance 
of Delaware corporate law and corporate litigation in Delaware courts. 23 Naturally, the 
state corporate bar carefully controls corporate law legislation. 24 
But Delaware is a small state. For a large state, even grabbing all Delaware's 
franchise fees and spinoff income would not be very significant. 25 If another state did 
threaten to lure companies, Delaware would certainly fight back by revising its corporate 
law, lowering its incorporation fees, or both. Thus, a potential competitor faces the 
prospect of incurring considerable expense to enter the race with no assurance of much 
return. 
If another state offered minor improvements over Delaware's law, Delaware would 
probably not even react because it would not lose many companies. Delaware dominates 
because of path dependency-it is favored not because of its statute, which does not 
differ much from other states' laws, but because it has a better developed body of 
corporate case law that is familiar to lawyers and business people nationwide. 26 Its 
Chancery Courts are well known for their expertise in handling business litigation, and 
the Delaware courts are notoriously partial to managers. 27 In the rare case when a court 
22. Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 5, at 581 n.66 (calculating that Delaware derives about 27% of its tax 
revenues from franchise fees). 
23. See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 21, at 694-99 (describing income to Delaware from corporate 
litigation in the state); Roberta A. Romano, Law as Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, I J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 225, 278-79 (1985); Comment, Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporation Law of 
/967, I I 7 U. PA. L. REv. 861, 888-90 (1969) [hereinafter Law for Sale]. 
24. See ROBERTA A. ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 28-31 (1993); Ernest Folk, 
III, Some Reflections of a Co1poration Law Draftsman, 42 CoNN. B.J. 409, 410-12 (1968) (stating that the 1963 
committee that reviewed the Delaware law "consisted chiefly of pro-management corporation attorneys ... the 
only interest represented [in the committee] was management"); Lawrence A. Hamermesh, The Policy 
Foundations of Delaware Co~porate Law, 1.06 COLUM. L. REv. 1749, 1754-57 (2006) (describing the operation 
of the Council of Corporation Law Section. of the Delaware State Bar Association); Jonathan R. Macey & 
Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 506-
09 (1987); Law for Sale, supra note 23, at 868. 
25. See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 5, at 556, 584 (stating that for large states the potential profits 
"would not be significant"). For instance, Nevada, striving to be the "Delaware of the West," took in only 
$26,200 from the 18 companies that went public as Nevada corporations between 1996-2000. Kahan & Kamar, 
supra note 21, at 693. 
26. See Oren Bar-Gill et al., The Market for Corporate Law, 162 J. lNSTL. & THEORETICAL ECON. 134, 
I 3 7 (2006) ("A state that has moved first to invest in legal infrastructure will be able to obtain, and 
subsequently maintain, a dominant position."); id. at 151-52, 155-56 (elaborating on the first-mover 
advantage); Adam C. Pritchard, London as Delaware? 10 (University of Michigan Law School, John M. Olin 
Center for Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 09-008, 2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=14076ID 
("The predictability of Delaware law is further bolstered by the large stock of precedents to which its courts can 
look in deciding cases."). 
27. See Pritchard, supra note 26, at 10 (stating that Delaware guarantees that when litigation is brought, 
the directors will not be held personally liable). See generally Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware 
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ruling upsets managers, the legislature quickly amends the law to restore calm. 28 
Delaware's deference to managers is subject to an instructive exception. In periods 
of dissatisfaction with its corporate law and agitation for federal legislation, the Delaware 
courts issue opinions seeming to ramp up the protection of investors. As soon as the heat 
is off, the kowtowing to CEOs resumes. 29 
Although the Delaware Chancery could be copied by other states, the effort would 
impose another big startup cost. A new court could not quickly match the reputation of 
the Delaware Chancery for expertise and for catering to management. 30 An aspiring 
competitor would have to commit to a long-term, expensive effort with no guarantee of 
much success. 
The well developed case law and level of familiarity with Delaware law also could 
not be equaled by another state for many years, even if it did capture much of Delaware's 
franchise business. In sum, the barriers to competing with Delaware discourage any 
serious race among the states to the top, the bottom, or anywhere else. The potential for 
competition from other states or for preemption by the federal government does restrain 
Delaware somewhat, but it hardly assures an optimal system. 
Although other states have made little effort to snatch Delaware's franchise 
business, there is evidence of defensive competition. 31 In a few cases, Delaware amended 
its corporate law so as to lure some companies from other states. 32 Many states 
responded by copying Delaware's changes in an effort to keep corporations they already 
had. 33 The effect of these efforts (or their absence) was significant-states that reacted 
slowly to Delaware's initiative lost many more corporations than did states that 
responded quickly.34 
2. The Best Corporate Law for Whom? 
Although interstate competition is weak, Delaware still has an incentive to offer the 
most attractive corporation law. But attractive to whom? The obvious answer is those 
Courts in the Competition for Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061 (2001) {discussing the unique roles 
of the Chancery courts in corporate lawmaking). 
28. See Gordon Moodie, Forty Years of Charter Competition: A Race to Protect Directors from Liability? 
39-41 (John M. Olin Fellows' Discussion Paper Series, Discussion Paper No. 1, 2004), available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/fellows_papers/pdf/Moodie_l.pdf (describing the quick 
adoption of Delaware General Corporation Law section I 02(b ){7) in order to legislatively negate Smith v. Van 
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985)). 
29. See Jones, supra note 21, at 629, 644-62 (describing Delaware's responses to the federal preemptive 
threat); Moodie, supra note 28, at 33 ("As the federal threat abated [in the early 1980s], Delaware's approach 
gradually changed back in favor of managers."); Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARv. L. REv. 
588, 642 (2003) (describing several incidents in which Delaware modified its pro-managerial tilt under federal 
threat, then restored that tilt once the threat dissipated). 
30. See Law for Sale, supra note 23, at 861-62 ("Delaware is in the business of selling its corporation 
law" and it therefore "tries to give the [CEO] what he wants. In fact, those who will buy the product are not 
only consulted about their preferences, but are also allowed to design the product and run the factory."); see 
also Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 5, at 599-601,607-08, 615. 
31. See Moodie, supra note 28, at 20-27, 42-52 (surveying other states' actions and Delaware's 
response). 
32. See id. at 17-20. 
33. See id. at 20-27. 
34. Id. at 25, 51-52. 
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who have the power to decide where to incorporate. In public companies that is the top 
managers, especially the CE0.35 Shareholders alone cannot change the state of 
incorporation. 36 Neither can managers alone make the change, but a typically compliant 
board can propose a change to shareholders and expend corporate funds to exhort them to 
approve it. Board proposals enjoy a big advantage in a proxy vote; they are generally 
adopted unless the measure would seriously damage share value. 37 
Delaware corporate law might cater to investors rather than executives if investors 
could influence Delaware's politics. They cannot. Less than one percent of the American 
population and, accordingly, fewer than one percent of American shareholders of public 
companies, live and vote in Delaware. 38 Investors who live elsewhere can wield little 
influence in Delaware politics. 
As a result, Delaware law heavily favors managers and directors over 
shareholders. 39 To the extent that there is competition for incorporations among the 
states, it is competition to appeal to managers. In two cases where other states reacted 
defensively by copying changes in Delaware law, the changes expanded the scope of 
permissible indemnification and insurance of directors and permitted elimination of the 
directors' duty of care. 40 
When a public company shifts its domicile to Delaware from another state, its stock 
price typically rises. 41 However, announcements of plans for such a shift are often 
35. See Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 5, at 133 ("Managers have significant control over reincorporation 
decisions."). The same incentive drives the other states. See id. at 140 (referring to the "persistent and uniform 
tendency of states to provide considerable protection to incumbents"); see also Bar-Gill et a!., supra note 26, at 
136 ("[W]ith respect to rules that have a substantial effect on managers' private benefits of control ... states 
might adopt rules that make shareholders worse off."). 
36. "[R]eincorporation is generally accomplished by merging the corporation into a shell corporation 
incorporated in the desired state." Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 
HARV. L. REv. 833, 844 (2005). This requires a resolution of the board of directors before a shareholder vote. 
See id. at 846-47; see also, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, §§ 241, 251 (2002-03); see also WILLIAM MEADE 
FLETCHER, CORPORATION FORMS ANNOTATED§ 1883.14 (4th ed. 2009) (describing shifting incorporation from 
one state to another by creation of a new corporation in the destination state and merging the old corporation 
into the new). 
37. See Yair Listokin, Management Always Wins the Close Ones, 10 AM. L. & EcoN. REv. 159, 161-62, 
172-82 (2008) (showing that "management-sponsored proposals ... are overwhelmingly more likely to win a 
corporate vote by a very small amount than lose by a very small amount"); Bayless Manning, Book Review, 
Livingston, The American Stockholder, 67 YALE L.J. 1477, 1485-89 (1958) (describing incumbent control of 
the proxy voting machinery). 
38. According to the 2000 census, Delaware has about one-quarter of one percent of the population of the 
United States. See Delaware QuickFacts from the U.S. Census Bureau, http://quickfacts.census.gov/ 
gfd/states/1 OOOO.htrnl (last visited Feb. 26, 201 0). 
39. See Folk, supra note 24, at 410 (stating that corporate law revisions were "exclusively concerned with 
only one constituent of the corporate community-management"); Manuel Cohen, Introduction, in PROXY 
CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL XV (E. Aranow & H. Einhorn eds., 1968) ("The history of state 
corporation laws over the past decade ... has been one of reducing protections for shareholders and expanding 
the discretion of corporate management."). Another reason for Delaware's popularity with executives may be its 
strong protections of financial secrecy. See Nick Mathiason, Delaware -A Black Hole in the Heart of America, 
THE OBSERVER, Nov. 1, 2009, at 8. 
40. See Moodie, supra note 28, at 20-27, 42-52 (discussing other states imitating Delaware's 
liberalization of its director liability statute). 
41. See Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the Law: Part II: Empirical Studies of 
C01porate Law, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 380, 381 (2002) (reviewing in detail how event studies have been used 
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accompanied by announcements of other beneficial corporate developments (such as the 
listing of the firm's stock on a major stock exchange), so the typical rise in stock price 
may be a response to the accompanying good news, and not to the adoption of Delaware 
corporation law. 42 This inference is supported by the lack of evidence that incorporation 
in Delaware is generally associated with higher stock prices or other indicia of value. 43 
Even if incorporation in Delaware is associated with higher stock prices, that correlation 
could reflect just "network externalities, which arise when many companies choose to 
incorporate in one specific state."44 
It is also argued that investors can price the quality of a company's governance, 
including its applicable state law, so insiders have an incentive to choose the best state of 
incorporation when a company goes public.45 The market for initial public offerings 
(IPOs) has many inefficiencies, though. 46 At most, then, the frequent choice of Delaware 
by firms making IPOs shows that no other state's Jaw is greatly superior. The discussion 
in the preceding Part explains why this is so. 47 
II. THE PROMISE OF FEDERAL INCORPORATION 
Why might a federal corporation law be better than existing state laws? First, the 
economic incentives are different for the federal government than for the states. Again, 
Delaware gets a substantial part of its revenue from franchise fees, and therefore is 
motivated to maximize that revenue. That amount of revenue is too small to influence the 
to evaluate the wealth effects of corporate and securities law and corporate governance); Lucian Bebchuk, Alma 
Cohen & Allen Ferrell, Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CAL. L. REv. 1775, 
1792-94 (2002). 
42. See ROMANO, supra note 24, at 250; Bhagat & Romano, supra note 41, at 385. 
43. See, e.g., Subramanian, supra note 2, at 33 (finding no evidence of a correlation in the 1 990s, except 
for firms with small market value). 
44. Bar-Gill et al., supra note 26, at 142. "Such externalities include the benefits that a company may 
enjoy from having more precedents to rely on and from being subject to rules and practices with which capital 
market participants are well familiar." !d. at 136. See also Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization 
and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or "The Economics of Boilerplate"), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 733-36 
(1997) (discussing the effects of network externalities);.Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and 
Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REv. 757, 772-86 (1995) (discussing corporate contract terms and network 
externalities). 
45. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Response, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowennent, 119 
HARv. L. REV. 1735, 1737 (2006) (discussing benefits for investors when a corporation goes public); Jeffrey N. 
Gordon, Shareholder Initiative: A Social Choice and Game Theoretic Approach to Corporate Law, 60 U. CJN. 
L. REv. 347, 358 (1991) (positing that "entrepreneurs selling stock to the public would bear the cost" of 
suboptimal corporate governance terms); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Corporate Constitutionalism: 
Antitakeover Charter Provisions as Precommitment, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 473, 502 (2003) ("(W]e continue to 
believe that the IPO charter terms provide substantial evidence of appropriate governance structures."); Lynn A. 
Stout, Do Antitakeover Defenses Decrease Shareholder Wealth? The Ex Post/Ex Ante Valuation Problem, 55 
STAN. L. REv. 845, 853-56 (2002) ("[S)hareholders act as if they value corporate governance rules that insulate 
boards from hostile takeovers.") (emphasis added). 
46. See Dent, supra note 9, at 1256-60 (discussing vulnerabilities in evaluating IPOs); see also Jay C. 
Hartzell, Jarl G. Kallberg & Crocker H. Liv, The Role of Corporate Governance in Initial Public Offerings: 
Evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts, 51 J.L. & EcoN. 539, 539 (2008) (empirical study finding that 
companies with strong shareholder rights "have higher JPO valuations"). 
47. See supra Part l.B.l (noting that Delaware's greatest advantage is the level of experience and 
reputation ofthe corporate bar). 
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federal government. Unlike Delaware, the federal government would not be swayed by 
the lure of related income (e.g., to local lawyers) since all the related activity already 
occurs and will continue to occur somewhere within the United States. Indeed, 
Congressional representatives from the other 49 states have an incentive to spread this 
income around more equally, rather than having it concentrated in tiny Delaware. 
Congress should also care more than the Delaware legislature does about the hundreds of 
billions of dollars lost to the national economy by poor corporate governance. 48 
Second, the political vectors differ for the federal government. Fewer than one 
percent of investors live and vote in Delaware, but all shareholders of American 
companies other than foreigners can vote in federal elections. Although investors always 
face collective action problems, 49 there are investor organizations that strive to influence 
federal law. 50 At the least, the playing field is not so severely tilted against shareholders 
at the federal level as it is in Delaware. 
The resources and structure of the federal government make it less likely to snub 
investor concerns. Congressional staffs are larger than those of state legislatures. Part of 
the work of the Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and other government agencies is to 
analyze the economic effects of government policy. The SEC and other agencies are 
charged with protecting the interests of investors. With these resources and missions, the 
federal government can poll and weigh investor concerns, rather than having to rely on 
well funded and organized corporate executives and their lawyers, as Delaware does. 51 
Finally, only the federal government has the authority to preempt state law. 52 States 
cannot lure public companies from Delaware by catering to shareholders, because under 
Delaware law shareholders cannot change the state of incorporation. 53 The federal 
government, however, could preempt state law and permit shareholders alone to shift the 
state of incorporation. 54 
48. See Bebchuk & Harndani, supra note 5, at 613-14 ("The federal government ... has different 
incentives .... [It] would take into account not only the likely effects ... on its incorporation-related revenues, 
but also the overall effect on the economy."). 
49. See Coates, supra note 8, at 849 (stating that the two traditional collective action problems facing 
shareholders are "costs of communication, negotiation, and coordination" and "free-riding"); Shann Turnbull, 
Invigorating Capitalism 4 (Sixth International Conference on Corporate Governance & Board Leadership Paper, 
2003, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=437981) (stating that cost-benefit analysis, free riders, and uncertain 
outcomes prompt "institutional shareholders to be 'reluctant,' apathetic or negligent in exercising their 
ownership rights"). 
50. One such group is the Council for Institutional Investors. About the Council, http://www.cii.org/about 
(last visited Jan. 25, 2010). Another is Investors for Director Accountability. See Investors for Direct 
Accountability, http://www.investorsfordirectoraccountability.org/about.htrnl (last visited Jan. 25, 2010). 
Another is ShareOwners.Org, a new web-based organization intended to give investors a bigger voice in 
regulatory reform. See Shareholders.org, http://www.shareowners.org (last visited Feb. 26, 20 10); see also 
Jones, supra note 21, at 636-37 (describing the participation of investor groups in some federal corporate and 
securities law matters). 
5 I. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (describing potential conflicts of interest). 
52. U.S. CoNST. art. VI, § I cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States ... shall be the 
supreme Law of the Land .... "). 
53. See supra note 36 (discussing the methods for changing a company's state of incorporation from 
Delaware to another state). 
54. See inji-a Part IV.A (discussing the potential implications of shareholder selection procedures). 
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It bas been urged that the federal government (both Congress and the SEC) not 
actually intervene in corporate governance, but only threaten to intervene. 55 One 
argument for this approach is that the federal government is likely to botch actual 
intervention, citing the example of SOX. 56 However, federal intervention has often been 
beneficial. 57 Further, the argument begs the question of bow benign state (i.e., Delaware) 
corporate law now is. Delaware's corporate law now is so bad 58 that even a badly flawed 
federal statute might well be better. Most important, though, the intervention proposed 
here is merely optional; if an optional federal corporate law is not materially superior to 
the state law under which a company is already incorporated, shareholders will simply 
not opt into the federal law. 
It is also hard to see how a strategy of federal threats to intervene could be 
effectively implemented. In order to work, the strategy must be backed up sometimes by 
actual intervention. If it is not, the states will soon realize that it is a bluff and ignore it. 
However, Congress is ill-suited to make threats and then "wait a sufficiently long period 
oftime"59 to give Delaware a chance to mend its ways before Congress intervenes. For 
Congress, corporate law is a minor issue that it addresses only during brief periods of 
public outrage, 60 and then it tends not to wait but to act hastily and clumsily. 61 
The threaten-and-wait strategy also invites a sham response by Delaware. Knowing 
Congress's short attention span in matters of corporate law, Delaware can pretend to take 
the steps that Congress wants. When the heat is off, Delaware can revert to its usual anti-
investor policies. Evidently, that is exactly what Delaware does. 62 
Because of the problems of Congressional intervention, it is suggested that the 
strategy of threats would be better implemented by the SEC. 63 However, the SEC's 
jurisdiction is limited to matters like disclosure and proxy solicitations; it does not extend 
to corporate governance in general. 64 If it tries to correct problems of state corporate law, 
its effort must be indirect, and probably inefficient. There is no movement now among 
55. See Note, The Case for Federal Threats in Corporate Governance, 118 HARV. L. REv. 2726,2741-47 
(2005) [hereinafter Federal Threats] (arguing that federal threats could be effective, even without acting on 
these threats); see also Jones, supra note 21, at 629 ("I urge a sustained vigilance from Congress and a 
willingness to take limited preemptive measures when state corporate Jaw rules fall short in providing adequate 
protection for investors."). 
56. See Federal Threats, supra note 55, at 2740-41 (arguing that Congress hastily considered and 
approved SOX, leading to an inefficient response). 
57. See supra note I 7 (marshalling sources citing effective federal regulations). 
58. See supra Part I. 
59. Federal Threats, supra note 55, at 2742. 
60. See infra note 98 and accompanying text (arguing that Congress only addresses corporate Jaw when it 
becomes a hot-button issue). 
61. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (citing prior ineffective or counterproductive regulations). 
62. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (arguing that Delaware corporation Jaw caters to 
management at the expense of investors). 
63. See Federal Threats, supra note 55, at 2742 (noting that the "SEC can make threats by considering 
proposed rules"). 
64. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975) ("[E]xcept where federal Jaw expressly requires certain 
responsi~ilities of directors with respect to stockholders, state Jaw will govern the internal affairs of the 
?orporatwn.") (emphasis added); see also Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (rejecting an 
~nterpretation of SEC Rule I Ob-5 under which "the federal securities Jaw would overlap and quite possibly 
mterfere with state corporate law''). 
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investors or anyone else to expand the SEC's jurisdiction to corporate governance, and 
such a move could lead to serious public choice problems. 65 
III. WHY OPTIONAL? 
If federal incorporation holds such promise, why not make it mandatory for public 
companies? Mandatory federal incorporation has often been proposed. 66 There are some 
arguments for it, but they are not compelling. Moreover, mandatory federal incorporation 
would pose some dangers that would be avoided by an optional system. 
Mandatory federal incorporation would provide uniformity. The rules would be the 
same for all public companies, and the courts would develop a uniform body of case law. 
Uniformity would reduce the costs to lawyers, investors, and business people of having to 
deal with 50 different state laws. A national body of case law could also reduce the 
uncertainty of the current system, in which the division of case law into 50 separate 
bodies leaves many issues unsettled in many states. 67 
Lack of uniformity and uncertainty about the law are not major problems now, 
though. Since most public companies are incorporated in Delaware, its statute to some 
extent functions as a national law, and its case law is well developed. Other states tend to 
follow Delaware, 68 which further enhances uniformity and predictability. 
Mandatory federal incorporation would also eliminate the transaction costs and 
inefficiencies of having to opt in to federal incorporation. No proxy votes or other action 
would be needed, and there would be no possibility of wrong choices. However, proxy 
statements already typically present many proposals, including several shareholder 
proposals mandated by public law. 69 The cost of adding a one-time item to the proxy 
statement of each public company would be small. 
The chances of shareholders making a bad choice are small. Shareholders are 
sophisticated, get good advice, and tend to vote wisely. 70 A vote on whether to elect 
federal incorporation would get close attention, especially since it would initially arise 
simultaneously for all public companies. If a federal law is indeed shareholder friendly, 
corporate executives will certainly give full voice to the arguments against it. In the 
unlikely event that shareholders later concluded that they had made wrong choices in 
65. See infi'a notes 100-02 and accompanying text (arguing that corporate special interests will prevail 
over less-powerful investors). 
66. See, e.g., Note, Federal Charte1ing of Cotporations: A Proposal, 61 GEO. L.J. 89, 95-96 (1972) 
(giving the history of efforts for mandatory federal incorporation); Kent Greenfield, It's Time to Federalize 
Corporate Charters: Delaware and Other States Aren't Tough Enough, TOMPAINE.COM, July 26, 2002, 
http://www.corporation2020.org/corporation2020/documents/Resources/Greenfield_Charters.htrn (noting that 
most states will not reform corporate Jaw because they fear losing substantial revenue). 
67. Indeed, one widely recognized advantage of Delaware is that its case law is better developed and 
more predictable than that of other states. See Pritchard, supra note 26, at 10 (stating that the "predictability of 
Delaware law is further bolstered by the large stock of precedents to which its courts can look in deciding 
cases"). 
68. See Moodie, supra note 28, at 20 (stating that "Delaware's success led to widespread imitation"); id. 
at 20-27, 42-52 (documenting that claim); see also Romano, supra note 23, at 233-37 (stating that other states 
"follow the leader" because they would otherwise "lose incorporations at the margin"). 
69. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2009) (requiring inclusion of certain shareholder proposals in proxy 
statements of public companies). 
70. See infra note 85 and accompanying text. 
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some or all cases, federal law can (and should) allow them to change again. 7l 
Third, mandatory federal incorporation would allow a corporate governance system 
that would serve the interests of stakeholders other than shareholders and managers. It 
has been argued that the employees, customers, suppliers, and communities in which a 
company operates have concerns about the company that should be represented in 
corporate governance. 72 The general public also has concerns about corporate conduct 
with respect, for example, to activities affecting the environment. These stakeholders 
have no direct voice in corporate governance under current state law. 73 If federal 
incorporation is optional, inclusion of stakeholder interests under federal corporate law 
may repel shareholders from electing that option. 
However, direct stakeholder participation in corporate governance is a bad idea. 74 
Employees, customers, and suppliers can protect their interests through contracts with the 
corporation that specify the consideration on both sides. The general public can protect its 
interests in matters like the environment by legislation addressed to those issues. By 
contrast, the shareholders' relationship with the corporation is not a true contract at all, 
and it gives shareholders almost no specific rights. 75 Investors have some protections 
under state and federal law, but these are inadequate. 76 Moreover, only shareholders have 
an incentive to maximize profit, which corresponds with society's interest in maximizing 
efficiency. 77 Thus, the possibility that mandatory federal incorporation would give 
stakeholders a substantial role in corporate governance is a liability of that approach, not 
an asset. 
Mandatory federal incorporation would invite other problems. 78 Although the 
federal political arena would give shareholders a more level playing field than do the 
states, Congress would, as always, be tempted to use mandatory federal incorporation to 
indulge rent-seeking by other special interests. 79 The power of investors to reject federal 
71. See infra Part IV.A. 
72. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, Defending Stakeholder Govemance, 58 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1043 (2009) 
(arguing that, to succeed, businesses must include a wide array of people and entities in financial investments). 
73. See id. at 1044. 
74. See George W. Dent, Jr., Stakeholder Govemance: A Bad Idea Getting Worse, 58 CASE W. REs. L. 
REv. 1107, 1107 (2008) (arguing that shareholder primacy is the preferred system). 
75. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Shareholder Activism in the Obama Era 3-4 (UCLA School of Law, 
Law-Econ Research Paper No. 09-14, 2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=l437791 (cataloging direct 
and indirect limits on shareholder powers); Bebchuk, supra note 36, at 843-47 (same). 
76. See supra text following note 20; supra Part I.B.2. 
77. Jonathan R. Macey, Fiduciwy Duties as Residual Claims: Obligations to Nonshareholder 
Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 1266, 1267-68 (1999) 
("[S]hareholders, as residual claimants, have the greatest incentive to maxiroize the value of the firm."). See 
also FRANK H. EAStERBROOK & DANJEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 68 
(1991) ("As the residual claimants, shareholders have the appropriate incentives ... to make discretionary 
decisions."); E. Han Kiro, Corporate Govemance and Labor Relations, 21 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 57, 57 (2009) 
("[S]hareholders ... are in the best position to make the value-maxiroizing tradeoffs that all companies 
confront."); id. at 58 ("Taking their perspective ends up increasing the odds that social resources are put to their 
highest valued uses."); Anant K. Sundaram & Andrew C. lnkpen, TI1e C01porate Objective Revisited, 15 ORG. 
Sci. 350, 353 (2004) ("Only residual cash flow claimants have the incentive to maximize the total value of the 
firm."). 
78. See ROMANO, supra note 24, chs. 4-5; Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 5, at 141. 
79. The initial enthusiasm for investor control might assure that a mandatory federal incorporation law 
would favor shareholders. Over tiroe, however, the collective action problem inherent in such a large, scattered 
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incorporation if it does not serve their interests would limit the ability of federal 
incorporation to saddle public companies with inefficiencies. 
Mandatory federal incorporation would also forfeit the benefits of jurisdictional 
competition. Even if Congress tries to serve the public rather than special interests, there 
is disagreement about the optimal features of corporate law. 80 Under optional federal 
incorporation, the states could compete for franchise fees by trying to offer a law more 
appealing to shareholders. 81 Mandatory federal incorporation would preclude such 
competition. 
Some have argued for federal minimum standards for state incorporation instead of 
mandatory federal incorporation. 82 Although this approach might improve on the status 
quo, it is less promising than optional federal incorporation, because it would establish 
mandatory national standards. It would pose most of the dangers of mandatory federal 
incorporation. Congress would still be tempted to cater to special interests. Even if well-
intended, the federal law might be sub-optimal. In either case, injured investors would 
have no way of opting out of detrimental national rules. 
Minimum federal standards would also foster complications, rather than the greater 
simplicity and certainty of optional federal incorporation. Litigation would be necessary, 
possibly quite often, to determine whether a state's law met the federal minimum. Such 
litigation would raise federal questions and therefore would presumably be delegated to 
the federal courts. If litigation over ordinary interpretation were relegated to state courts, 
case law would be fragmented and thus less certain than a uniform federal body of law. 
Difficult issues might be shunted back and forth between state and federal judiciaries. 
group as investors, see supra note 50, could weaken their influence and allow manager and stakeholder interests 
to obtain anti-investor revisions of the federal law, or, at least, block desirable pro-shareholder revisions. See 
Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 5, at 141--42 (arguing that a mandatory federal incorporation would be less 
desirable than the current state incorporation system). This seems to have happened as management interests 
have persuaded Congress to restrict civil claims under the federal securities laws. See Steven A. Ramirez, 
Arbitration and Reform in Private Securities Litigation: Dealing with the Meritorious as Well as the Frivolous, 
40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1055, 1087 n.l56 (1999) (describing management efforts that led to the restrictions 
imposed by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995); see also MILLS, supra note 8, at 87 
(describing how lobbyists representing auditing firms thwarted SEC head Arthur Levitt's attempts to eliminate 
some conflicts of interest by barring auditors to also do consulting for those whom they audit). 
80. See, e.g., supra notes 18 (concerning disagreement over the effects of SOX), 20-21 (discussing 
whether there is a "race to the top" among the states), 72-77 and accompanying text (concerning disagreement 
over the desirability of a direct stakeholder voice in corporate governance); infra notes 93-96 
and accompanying text (concerning disagreement over the desirability of enhancing shareholder power in 
corporate governance). 
81. Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 5, at 613 ("In Canada, the introduction of a federal option has had a 
substantial impact on the rules offered by the provinces .... ") (citing Douglas Cummings & Jeffrey Macintosh, 
The Role of Interjurisdictional Competition in Shaping Canadian Corporate Law, 20 INT'L REv. L. & EcoN. 
141 (2000) (undertaking an empirical examination of both the supply and demand sides of Canadian corporate 
law to determine whether competitive corporate law production in Canada shares any similarities with United 
States corporate law)); Ronald Daniels, Should Provinces Compete? The Case for a Competitive Corporate Law 
Market, 36 McGILL L.J. 130 (1991). 
82. See Cary, supra note 2, at 696-705; Joel Seligman, The Case for Federal Minimum Corporate Law 
Standards, 49 MD. L. REV. 947, 949 (1990) (supporting "minimalist federal corporate law" in light of the 
deterioration of old restraints on corporate managers). 
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IV. THE CONTENT OF A FEDERAL OPTION 
A. Selection Procedures 
A potential problem with optional federal incorporation is that under current state 
law, entrenched executives have the power to prevent a corporation from reincorporating 
in another jurisdiction. 83 If an optional federal corporation law would weaken their hold 
on corporate power, they could block shareholders from opting into that law. It is 
therefore essential that an optional federal incorporation law allow public companies to 
elect that option by a simple shareholder vote. 84 
It is most unlikely that shareholders would vote against their best interests. They 
have already shown themselves able to vote in their own interests. Shareholders 
(especially of mutual funds) tend to support proxy proposals that increase share value. 85 
They certainly could be expected to do so on such an important question as whether to 
choose a new federal corporation law. 
Opponents of increased shareholder power (other than stakeholder advocates) 
charge that shareholders are often myopic and that different shareholders have very 
different goals and interests. They claim that expanding shareholder power would result 
in public companies focusing excessively on short-term results 86 and in battles among 
83. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text (noting that shareholders alone cannot change the state 
of incorporation). 
84. See Bar-Gill et a!., supra note 26, at 154 (stating that the current incentives of states to cater to 
managers "can be improved by giving shareholders the power to initiate and adopt reincorporation decisions"). 
85. See Angela Morgan eta!., Mutual Funds as Monitors: Evidence from Mutual Fund Voting 30 (July 7, 
2009) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssm.com/abstract= 143 I 072) (finding, in an empirical study, 
that mutual "funds tend to support proposals which are likely to positively impact shareholder wealth," which 
"supports the theory that mutual funds act as effective monitors when exercising their proxy voting rights"). 
Proxy advisory services would surely make recommendations on these votes, and their recommendations are 
associated with positive stock price effects. See Cindy R. Alexander et al., The Role of Advisory Services in 
Proxy Voting 3, 16, 34-35 (Nat'! Bureau ofEcon. Research Working Paper Series No. 15143, 2009), available 
at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl5143 (finding, in an empirical study, that the recommendations of Institutional 
Shareholder Services, the largest proxy advisory service, are associated with positive stock price changes); see 
also Lucian A. Bebchuk, Reply: Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. REv. I 784, 1799 (2006) 
("Although a wide range of precatory resolutions are put forward [for shareholder vote], the ones that obtain 
majority support are those . . . that are widely viewed by financial institutions as serving shareholder 
interests."); Yair Listokin, Corporate Voting versus Market Price Setting, 11 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 608, 610, 
622-27 (2009) (fmding in empirical study that "[w]hen management wins a close [proxy contest] election, 
market value declines; when a dissident wins, the value rises"); Luc Renneboog & Peter Szilagyi, Shareholder 
Activism Through the Proxy Process 3 (CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2009-031), available at 
http://ssm.com/abstract=I460578 (empirical study finding that "shareholder proposals tend to be carefully 
targeted at firms that both underperform and have generally poor governance structures" and that "proposal 
announcements . . . are actually met with significantly positive stock price reactions"). The trend for 
institutional investors to hold larger blocks of stock of individual companies may further improve shareholder 
voting because large blockholders tend to do better monitoring. See Aviv Pichhadze, The Nature of Corporate 
Ownership in the USA: The Trend Towards the Market Oriented Blockholder Model, 5 CAPITAL MKT. L.J. 63, 
71-82 (2010) (describing the trend toward holding larger blocks); id. at 82-83 (stating that large blockholders 
engage in "increased monitoring"). 
86. See Patrick Bolton et al., Pay for Short-Term Pelformance: Executive Compensation in Speculative 
Markets, 30 J. CORP. L. 721, 725 (2005) (alleging a conflict between current shareholders who profit from 
"earnings manipulation" and future shareholders); William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder 
Value, 76 TUL. L. REv. 1275, 1284 (2002); Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, Election Contests in the 
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various shareholder groups trying to enrich themselves at the expense of other 
shareholders. 87 These accusations are almost entirely false. With a few exceptions 
(notably labor unions and employee pension plans), shareholders are remarkably united 
behind the goal of maximizing share value. 88 There is no credible evidence of substantial 
shareholder "short-termism;" indeed, the goal of maximizing share value rules out 
myopia. 89 To the extent that there is a problem of "short-termism" in American public 
companies, it stems from the skewed incentives of executives, not pressures from 
shareholders. 90 
A federal law giving shareholders continuing power to change the jurisdiction of 
incorporation would also prevent Congress from catering to corporate executives or other 
interest groups by changing the rules to the disadvantage of shareholders after public 
companies have opted into the federal law. Indeed, this power would precipitate ongoing 
competition among the states and the federal government to devise the law most 
attractive to shareholders, since managers would no longer be able to override the 
shareholders' preferences. 
There is little danger, though, that this competition would lead to such frequent 
changes as to cause confusion. Changing jurisdictions will always entail substantial 
transaction costs. Any shareholders seeking to change jurisdiction will have to absorb the 
costs of persuading a majority of their colleagues to approve the change. Inertia will 
favor the status quo. Only the promise of a substantial improvement is likely to earn that 
approval. 
Carl Icahn has proposed a federal law that would simply give shareholders the 
power to choose the state of incorporation. 91 This change might trigger a real race to the 
Company's Proxy: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 59 Bus. LAW. 67, 78 (2003) (stating that some 
shareholders "may seek to push the corporation into steps designed to create a short-term pop in the company's 
share price"); Lynn A. Stout, Why Carl Icahn Is Bad for Investors, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 2008, at All (stating 
that "'[a]ctivist' shareholders are usually short-termers"). 
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top. Since shareholders want to maximize share value rather than CEO welfare, states 
would have an incentive to stop striving for the latter and start striving for the former. If 
there are insuperable political obstacles to creation of a federal chartering option, Icabn's 
proposal would probably be a good second choice. However, even with shareholders 
choosing the state of incorporation, the financial incentives to the states would still be 
small, 92 so the race might be apathetic. Further, so long as federal incorporation is 
optional with the shareholders, it is hard to see what danger it poses. 
B. The Substantive Law 
There is considerable debate about the optimal rules of corporate law, but a 
convincing argument exists for giving shareholders greater power in corporate 
governance. Although the corporate bar that serves managers and some academics still 
oppose a stronger voice for shareholders, 93 the explosion of executive compensation, the 
corporate recklessness that has contributed to the current economic meltdown, and the 
flight of investors to other nations94 show that our corporate governance system now is 
broken. The SOX Act and other measures taken in the last few years to increase 
transparency and disclosure, to strengthen "gatekeepers" like lawyers and accountants, 
and to bolster the independence of corporate boards from the CEO have not worked.95 
Further steps of this kind will likely be unsuccessful also. 
There are many ideas for increasing shareholder power. I have suggested that the 
corporate governance problem could be solved simply by having each company's official 
slate of nominees for election to the board chosen by a committee of the 10-20 largest 
shareholders, rather than by the incumbent directors. 96 Even without a change in the 
composition of boards, this innovation would radically alter corporate governance-
directors would become responsive to shareholders rather than CEOs because they would 
know that they would be chosen by shareholders rather than the CEO. 
Steven Ramirez bas recommended the creation of a federal agency that would 
dictate governance standards for companies that choose federal incorporation in the way 
that the Federal Reserve Board dictates monetary policy. 97 Alth~ugh I generally applaud 
the substantive rules be proposes, it might be wiser to eschew a package of substantive 
rules in favor of an "enabling" act that allows companies wide discretion to set their own 
rules so long as ultimate power is vested in the shareholders. First, however wise and 
disinterested the drafters of specific rules may be, they can err. Rule-making is 
cumbersome. Specific rules may become outdated through failure to promptly adjust to 
rapidly changing conditions or to adopt new and better ideas when they emerge. Delay 
would be an even greater problem if rules were not subject to revision by an 
allow shareholders the power to move the state of incorporation of public companies from one state to 
another"). 
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administrative agency, but rather enshrined in a statute that could be amended only by 
Congress. There, corporate law is usually neglected in favor of matters of greater political 
significance, 98 and the complexities of law-making allow a small minority to block 
action supported by the majority. 
Further, it would be impossible for a federal agency (much less Congress) to 
consider the differences among various companies and to design the optimal governance 
program for each. 99 Better to leave enterprise design to shareholders, who have a 
financial motive to customize governance rules to maximize profits. 
More importantly, as public choice theory shows, in both legislation and regulation 
special interest groups often prevail over the public interest. 100 Although investors are 
more effective in law-making at the federal level than in Delaware, many other groups 
(e.g., labor unions, plaintiffs' lawyers, and local governments) also wield considerable 
clout there, !01 and they generally pursue different goals from the maximization of share 
value.102 A substantial number of the over 100 million Americans who are investors may 
be sufficiently aware and concerned to voice support once for a federal corporation law 
giving shareholders ultimate power. They will not be willing or able to exert themselves 
in frequent agency proceedings precipitated by management interests or other groups 
seeking exceptions to shareholder control for particular categories of companies. 
In summary, however desirable in general a particular set of corporate governance 
rules might be, it is unlikely that it could overcome interest group politics to be enacted 
into law; it would probably not be optimal for some companies; over time it would cease 
to be optimal; and it would be chipped away by interest groups better positioned for 
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lobbying than investors were. Better instead a law that simply gives shareholders ultimate 
control and lets them decide on specifics at the company level. They are unlikely to vote 
against their own (and the public's) interest in maximizing share value. 103 
More important than the initial content of an optional federal corporation law, 
though, is that its enactment will create a whole new ballgame. Experience with the initial 
law will be monitored by all affected groups, and some will undoubtedly call for 
revisions. With shareholders empowered to choose the jurisdiction of incorporation, the 
states will also be motivated to change their approach and compete for franchise fees by 
trying to design a law superior to the competing federal and state corporate laws. In sum, 
creation of an optional federal corporation law should ignite a process of thought, 
discussion, and competition by which corporate governance law will constantly evolve 
and improve. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The American economy suffers from the domination of corporations by CEOs who 
exercise control for their own benefit, at considerable cost to shareholders and to 
efficiency. The costs of this defect are rising as capital flees the United States for a 
growing number of countries that treat investors better. America's corporate governance 
problem began and persists because corporations are franchised by the states, and it is in 
the economic interest of the states (especially Delaware) to cater to CEOs because they 
control the choice of the state of incorporation. 
To break this destructive arrangement, the federal government should offer its own 
incorporation law as a voluntary alternative to the state franchises, and stipulate that the 
choice of jurisdiction will be made by shareholders alone. Shareholders are the only 
constituency whose goal is to maximize share value, and this goal coincides with 
society's interest in economic efficiency. Shareholders also have the sophistication to 
decide major corporate questions wisely. 
The federal government would have strong incentives to offer a law that facilitates 
the shareholders' goal of efficiency. The existence of this law and the institution of 
shareholder choice of jurisdiction of incorporation would motivate states to seek 
franchise fees by offering statutes that favor shareholders even more. Thus optional 
federal incorporation would trigger a true "race to the top," a competition to offer the 
most efficient corporation law. This process would make America more attractive to 
investors, and the resulting influx of investment capital would stimulate economic 
prosperity. 
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